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Peculiar Materials
Insights · Diligence

Keeping score on the magnet companies

Is this magnet headline for real? is about judging one announcement on the day it lands. This page is about the companies you already know: the handful building a magnet supply chain outside China, each publishing a steady stream of progress while they do it. The question there is not whether one claim is true. It is whether the story holds together across years.

I follow these companies for a living, so most of what follows I carry around in my head. You do not have to. Nearly all of it is public and a search away, and here is the order I look at it in.

Short versionKeep a ledger: what they said two years ago, what they said last year, and what they say now, and whether the verb has moved from "will" to "has." Count the announcements, and read the big ones down to their smallest true version. Then read the website like somebody who wants to buy a magnet, not somebody who wants to buy the stock. Find out what IP they own, what they license, and who carries the risk if a customer gets sued. Ask which grades they ship today. Put the plan on a globe and count the ocean crossings. Count the senior people who have left, and which chairs they left from. And read the careers page, which tells you what stage the plant is really at.

Peculiar Materials LLC · September 2026. Companies are named on this page only where the public record makes a point in their favor, with one exception: Molycorp, which no longer exists and whose plan is a matter of public record and of history. Where something is a warning sign about a company operating today, it is described without names, on purpose. This is a method, not a league table, and all of the companies in this field are doing something hard.

Disclosure. I worked at MP Materials on its Independence magnet plant, and I was general manager of Arnold Magnetic Technologies' operation in Switzerland. Both appear below as positive examples because the public record supports them. Everything said about them here comes from their own published releases, filings, call transcripts and websites, and nothing from my time at either.

What this page skips, so nobody mistakes it for complete: the financial statements themselves (cash runway, dilution, the terms of government loans, price floors and offtake prepayments), which are their own exercise; valuation, which is not a technical question; and the mining and separation end of the chain, where schedules slip for different reasons and deserve their own page.
Scroll to build the figures

Short versionWrite down what they said two years ago, what they said last year, and what they say now. Slips are normal. What matters is how big the slip is, whether it came with a reason, whether the new date held, and whether the verbs have moved from "will begin" to "has begun."

1 · The ledgerEvery plant finishes late

That is not cynicism, it is the base rate. Optimism is how anybody gets a plant funded in the first place, and I have never seen one of these finish early (if you have, I would like to meet the project manager). So a slip, on its own, is not the finding. The PATTERN of slips is.

The method is boring, and it works. For each milestone the company has named, pull the date they gave in every quarterly update and line them up. Earnings releases and call transcripts are archived by quarter, and the SEC's full-text search finds a phrase across every filing since 2001. For a private company, the Wayback Machine will show you what its news page said on almost any date.

The figure shows how to read the result. The diagonal is the day each statement was made, so a promise that reaches it has been kept. A flat line is a date that held. A staircase that climbs alongside the diagonal is a date that moves a quarter every quarter, and never arrives.

1 · The ledgerFour questions for every row

  • How big is the slip, next to the size of the job? A quarter on a four-year build is noise. A year on a two-year build is a replan, and should have been announced as one.
  • Did it come with a reason, and a specific one? "Customer qualification is taking longer than planned" is a reason. "Macroeconomic headwinds" is weather.
  • Did the new date hold? One slip is normal. A date that moves one quarter to the right every quarter is a date nobody believes internally either.
  • Did a milestone quietly disappear? A date that simply stops being mentioned is the slip that never shows up anywhere, unless you are keeping a ledger. That absence is the finding.

1 · The ledgerWhat it looks like done well

I have used MP Materials' Independence magnet plant in Fort Worth, because it has the longest public record in the field and because it is a good one. Every point on the figure is something the company said in public.1 How the chart flatters and how it doesn't is in the notes.2

Finished magnets held. From early 2022 the company said magnets in 2025. It repeated some version of that at essentially every quarterly update for four years, and it began making magnets on commercial equipment in December 2025. That is a long time to hold a date on a first-of-a-kind plant, and it is the line I would point to if somebody asked whether this team plans honestly.

1 · The ledgerMetal slipped a year, and said why

The original plan led with alloy for GM in late 2023. In November 2023 that date stopped appearing. What appeared instead was trial production of NdPr (neodymium-praseodymium) metal, and an explanation: the company had "shifted the focus to metal… because that's really more of a salable broader product," and was moving "methodically and thoughtfully" because "it's our capital risk."3

A new date (metal during 2024) came the next quarter, and commercial metal was announced in January 2025, three weeks past it. That is a slip. It is also exactly what a well-managed slip looks like: a reason, a new date, and a hit.

1 · The ledgerDeliveries are the open question

In January 2025, first deliveries were "on track for year-end." In November 2025, magnet revenue moved to "the second half of 2026," tied to qualification with GM. In August 2026 it became the fourth quarter, with the chief operating officer describing "a wide range of technical, operational, and customer-driven challenges."4

While a year is a real slip, a year to qualify a new supplier's magnets into a traction motor is realistic. Automotive qualification is slow for everybody, and it runs on the customer's calendar, not the supplier's. It is also the line to watch. The next entry in the ledger is either "has begun commercial shipments," or another quarter.

In practiceEvery plant start-up I have been part of had a schedule that was optimistic on the day it was written, and on some of those days I was the one holding the pen. What being on the inside taught me is that the first date is a guess and the SECOND date is information. By the time a team gives its second date, it has met the equipment, the vendors and the customer, and knows where the time actually goes. So I weight the second date far more heavily than the first, and I watch very closely whether it holds.

1 · The ledgerWill begin, has begun

The single most useful thing in the ledger is the verb. Announcements climb a ladder of tenses, and each rung is harder to write than the one below it: a plan, then money being spent, then equipment being commissioned, then trial production, then commercial production, and finally revenue.

MP's January 2025 release is a good example of the careful version. In one sentence it said the plant "has commenced commercial production" of NdPr metal and "trial production" of magnets.5 Two different rungs, in the same sentence, and it said so. A company that uses words precisely when precision is unflattering is a company whose flattering sentences you can believe.

The top rung is the only one the communications department cannot write. By the third quarter of 2025 the company's magnetics segment was reporting $21.9 million of quarterly revenue from what it called magnetic precursor products: metal and alloy, sold.6 Not magnets yet, and the release did not pretend otherwise.

1 · The ledgerCost estimates against outcomes

Schedules are half the ledger. The other half is money, and for a public company the check is mechanical: find the capital budget they gave, then find the line called "additions to property, plant and equipment" in the cash flow statement for the years that followed.

In April 2022, MP described "a $700 million investment the company will make over the next two years," spread across its separations upgrade, the Fort Worth plant and heavy rare earth separation.7 Two years later the chief financial officer said they remained "within the margin of error on that assessment despite enduring inflation," while "some of that spend will slip to 2024."8 The budget held and the calendar stretched. For several plants built through the inflation of 2022 and 2023, that is a good outcome, and a rarer one than it should be.

Two cautions. Spending UNDER guidance is not automatically good news: money not spent is usually work not done, and it tends to reappear a few quarters later as a schedule slip. And watch whether the estimate keeps getting restated. One that stops being mentioned, like a milestone that stops being mentioned, has usually been replaced by a bigger one.

1 · The ledgerCount the announcements, too

This one is rougher. It is less a test than a way to develop gut feel. As Lil Wayne said, “Real G’s move in silence” — and it holds up in magnets better than it has any right to. In my experience, companies that are moving in a serious way make fewer statements, and the claims in them are much more measured. Actually making something happen does not tend to leave a lot of energy for burning up the newswire.

So scroll back through a year of a company's news page and sort it into two piles. One pile is things that HAVE happened: a shipment, a qualification, a commissioning, a hire into a plant role. The other is things that WILL: a memorandum of understanding, a "strategic partnership," a site selection, an award, a panel appearance. A busy news page that is mostly the second pile belongs to a company whose main product, for now, is announcements.

Two cautions. Listed companies are required to disclose material events, so some of the volume from a public company is obligation, not promotion. The quarterly results and the current reports filed with the SEC are not what I am counting. And knowing how to promote yourself is not a crime.

Is it dispositive? No. Some very capable companies are also very good at press releases, and a quiet company can be quiet because nothing is happening. But when the newswire gets louder while the ledger above stops moving, I pay attention.

1 · The ledgerBig sound, narrow substance

Be especially wary of a company that makes a lot of splashy announcements that SOUND good and turn out, read closely, to be much narrower than the first impression. There is a structural reason it happens. People who deal with investors want to sound as grand as possible. People who deal with customers have to set expectations correctly, because the customer is going to hold them to it. A press release is usually written by the first group.

The habit to build is to read to the last paragraph and ask what the smallest true version of the headline is. The figure has the translations I make most often. None of them is dishonest; each headline is usually literally true. Judge the company on the smallest true version, and notice which companies announce the small true version themselves. Those are generally the ones with customers.

Short versionPretend you have a drawing and a budget, and try to buy a magnet. Count the clicks to a human who can quote it. Established producers make that almost impossible to miss.

2 · The websiteCould a customer actually buy something?

The companion page has the quick version of this test. This is the long version, which I run on every company I follow, about once a year. Start on the home page with a real part in mind, say a sintered block for a servo motor that runs warm. Is there a path organized around what I am building? A grade I could put on a drawing? A named way to reach a person who sells? And how far down the menu is "Investors"?

Arnold Magnetic Technologies is a good model. The top menu leads with Products and Markets, Markets breaks out fourteen industries, and every product page ends in a "Contact a specialist" form that asks where you are and what your project is, and takes a drawing upload.9 VAC's contact page adds an "Experts by Region" finder and a list of distributors.10 TDK runs its magnet pages like an electronic-component catalog, with part-number search and a distributor inventory check.11 None of it is glamorous. All of it says: we have product, and we would like you to buy some.

Compare the site that leads with a mission statement, a groundbreaking photo and a video; puts "Investors" in the top menu and "Contact" in the footer; and whose only commercial language is that the company is "partnering with strategic customers." That phrase earns its own flag. It usually means one or two anchor buyers, and no product yet for anybody else. That is a legitimate stage. But it is a stage, and at that stage the one or two customers matter far more than anything on the website.

2 · The websiteThe leadership page, in miniature

An established producer's leadership list is weighted toward the people who run plants and the people who sell what comes out of them: operations, quality, and commercial leads by region or market. A company whose leadership page is mostly finance, strategy, government affairs and communications is telling you, accurately, what its job is right now. Count the titles. The ratio is the finding.

In practiceHaving run one of these businesses, I can tell you what an established magnet maker worries about most on its own website: a customer with a drawing who cannot find a salesperson. A lost inquiry is the most expensive thing that can happen on the site, because the customer does not try twice. They send the drawing to the next name on the list. That is why the contact button follows you around from page to page, and why its absence tells you something.

Short versionThe foundational neodymium magnet patents expired years ago. The live ones cover process. Ask what a company owns, what it licenses, and what happens if a customer gets sued, because the last time this was fought in the United States, most of the defendants were customers.

3 · The IPWho got sued last time

In 2012, Hitachi Metals (now Proterial) filed a Section 337 complaint at the US International Trade Commission over sintered rare earth magnets and products containing them. There were 29 respondents. Three were magnet makers. The other twenty-six were companies that put magnets into things: motors, audio speakers, headphones, cordless tools, computer hard drives, golf ball markers.12

A Section 337 case can end in an exclusion order that stops infringing goods at the border, and the goods at the border belong to the importer, which is usually the customer. That case ended in 2013 without a ruling on the merits,13 but the lesson stuck with every purchasing department that lived through it. When a magnet infringes, the exposure lands on whoever brought it in.

3 · The IPWhat is still live

The core composition patent, from Sumitomo Special Metals' 1982 filing, expired in 2014, and the four patents asserted at the ITC ran out in 2021.14 What remains live is process, above all grain-boundary diffusion: putting dysprosium or terbium only at the grain surfaces, where it does its work. It is how the industry now makes most of its high-temperature motor grades, and some of the patents on it are still running. One of Shin-Etsu's core diffusion patents, for example, is listed as active until March 2027.15 (The heavy rare earth page explains why those two elements matter so much.)

3 · The IPFour questions

  • What patents do you own, granted or only applied for? Good: numbers you can look up. Noveon Magnetics holds granted US patents on its own grain-boundary engineering process,16 which is the right kind of IP to own: it sits where the fights are.
  • What do you license, and from whom? Good: a named licensor, or "we can't say who, but yes, and it covers these grades." Many licenses are confidential, so the lack of an announcement proves nothing. Concerning: "we don't need one," said about a diffusion grade, with no reason given.
  • How did you design around what you don't license? Good: a specific answer about a specific step. Concerning: "our process is proprietary," which answers a different question.
  • Will you indemnify me? Good: an IP indemnity clause in the supply agreement, offered without a fight. This turns everything above into money, and if I were buying, it is the one I would ask first.

Credit where it is due on openness. Magnequench, the bonded-magnet powder business inside Neo Performance Materials, publishes a patent guide, runs a monthly program testing magnets from the market for infringing material, and says in plain words that "users of magnets or products containing magnets should contact us directly if they have any patent related questions."17 That is IP treated as a customer-service problem, which is exactly what it is.

Short versionAsk for the grade list. Not the roadmap: the grades they will quote and ship this quarter, each with a datasheet.

4 · The gradesThree lists behind "our grades"

Grades we are shipping to paying customers. Grades we have made and measured. Grades we are targeting. A company early in its ramp will have a short first list and a long third one, which is fine, as long as nobody blurs them.

The established producers make this easy to check. VAC's VACODYM page is a table of about seventy-five grades, each linked to its own datasheet.18 Arnold publishes a datasheet for each neodymium grade, with normal and intrinsic demagnetization curves from −40 °C to 120 °C.19 If you want to know what they make, it is written down, with the conditions attached.

4 · The gradesWhat to look for in a newer list

Where it starts. Starting in the middle of the grade ladder, with the workhorse grades that have modest coercivity, is normal and sensible. Launching with the full ladder, up to the high-coercivity grades traction motors need, is a claim about process maturity AND about IP, and both deserve a question. The NdFeB grade chart shows how far apart the two ends are.

Whether "automotive-grade" names a material or a status. A grade becomes automotive in the only sense that counts when a carmaker has approved the part through its production part approval process (PPAP), which commonly takes a year or more. Read it as "intended for," not "approved by," unless a customer is named.

What the datasheet was measured on. Production parts, both curves, more than one temperature, a revision date. The headline page's first question covers it properly.

4 · The gradesTwo legitimate shortcuts

One is an established parent. eVAC's plant in Sumter, South Carolina shipped its first US-made magnets in December 2025, with a stated capacity of 2,000 metric tons a year by early 2026,20 and its product pages point to VAC's existing grade catalog rather than a new one. The hard problem for a plant like that is transferring a process, not discovering one.

The other is buying a business that already operates. USA Rare Earth closed its acquisition of Less Common Metals, a UK maker of rare earth metals and alloys with more than three decades of history and an existing customer base, in November 2025.21 Buying a step that already works is a perfectly good way to turn "will" into "has" for that step.

Short versionAcquiring know-how is good. Acquiring a supply chain one company at a time can leave you with a plan that makes no sense on a map. Draw it, count the ocean crossings, and note which step each one happens at.

5 · The globeKeep a globe handy

The cautionary tale here is Molycorp, which reopened Mountain Pass in California and then set out to own every step from mine to magnet by buying them. In 2011 it bought a controlling stake in Silmet, a rare earth processor in Sillamäe, Estonia, and Santoku America, an alloy maker in Tolleson, Arizona, and formed a magnet joint venture in Japan.22 In 2012 it bought Neo Material Technologies for its separation plants in China and Magnequench's powder plants in China and Thailand, a deal its chief executive said "enhances our Mine-to-Magnets vision and places Molycorp in all steps of the vertical rare earth supply chain."23

Every one of those was a real business with real know-how. The trouble was the map.

5 · The globeWhat actually moved where

By the company's own filings: separated oxides went from Mountain Pass to Estonia and to Arizona to be made into metals and alloys, and most of what Arizona sold went to a single customer in Japan.24 From 2012 and 2013, unseparated rare earth concentrate went from California to Estonia (about two-thirds of Silmet's feed in 2013) and to the Chinese separation plants, while the magnet business got its oxide from those Chinese plants and had it made into metal at a partner in China.25

Put that on a globe and it is a mine in California feeding separation on two other continents, metal-making on a third, and customers on a fourth, with the bulkiest material taking the longest trips.

5 · The globeWhy the top of the funnel is the wrong place to travel

Here is the arithmetic, and it is mine. Mountain Pass concentrate runs a little over 60 percent rare earth oxide, of which about 15 percent is neodymium and praseodymium.26 A sintered magnet is about 30 percent rare earth by weight.27 So a metric ton of finished magnet starts as something like 3.8 metric tons of concentrate, most of it cerium and lanthanum the magnet does not want. Ship the concentrate across an ocean and you move roughly ten times the tonnage of the NdPr oxide you were after.

And a cost picked up at the top of the funnel does not stay the size it was. Every downstream step loses some material, so every dollar of freight on the concentrate is carried through every loss after it, and lands on the finished magnet bigger than it started. (The yield calculator shows how that compounding works.) That is a very unfavorable place to concentrate your costs.

5 · The globeWhat to take from it

While the rare earth price collapse after 2011 is what finally sank Molycorp (the company said so itself when it idled Mountain Pass in 2015),28 the map was, in my view, one of the fatal flaws in the plan, and a big part of why it could not survive the price. Mountain Pass's own capital estimate went from about $511 million at the 2010 IPO to about $1.45 billion by early 2013,29 and the company filed for Chapter 11 in June 2015.30

The lesson is not "never import anything." Where the crossings happen matters more than whether they happen. Metal and alloy late in the funnel are dense in value, and moving them is a small cost per kilogram of magnet. Concentrate at the top is the opposite. So when a company builds its chain by acquisition, get the globe out: put each step on it, draw the arrows, count the oceans, and note which step each one happens at. Acquiring know-how is good. What you are checking is whether the overall plan is coherent.

Short versionList the former senior people: which function, how long they stayed, where they went. Some turnover is healthy. A revolving door in the chair that runs the plant is not.

6 · Who leftRead LinkedIn like a roster

This is the check people skip, because it feels like gossip. It isn't. The people who have left a company know more about it than anybody. They will not tell you what they know (and should not; they signed the same kind of NDAs I have), but their public career histories tell you a fair amount on their own.

Search the company on LinkedIn, open its People tab, and look for former vice presidents, directors and heads of. Note the function, the tenure, and where each went next. Then pull the leadership page from a year or two ago off the Wayback Machine and compare. Whose name is missing, and was the chair refilled?

Function matters more than count. A couple of finance or marketing leaders in a few years is a normal young-company life. A third head of operations, or a third head of quality, in three years is a plant problem, because those are the people who find out first whether the process works.

Tenure tells you whether it was the plan. Senior departures inside a year of being hired are the signal. People who stay two or three years and leave at a change of stage, construction to operations or operations to scale, are usually the plan working. The people who build a plant and the people who run one are different people, and good companies change the team on purpose.

Where they went. To a competitor or a customer is a functioning labor market. Out of the industry altogether, several at once, is worth a quiet question. And do not mistake a transition for an exit: a founder stepping back or a new chief executive at a financing round is how companies grow up.

In practiceThe most honest reference check for a company is the same as for a person: ask somebody who used to work there. Not about anything confidential. Just "would you go back?" The length of the pause before the answer is most of the answer.

Short versionJob postings are a map of what the company is about to do. The mix of roles tracks the stage of a plant closely enough to date it.

7 · Who's hiredThe careers page dates the plant

Job postings are the one corporate document nobody edits for narrative. Builders come first (project engineers, construction, procurement), then commissioners (controls, equipment technicians, maintenance planners), then the ramp (process engineers, operators on several shifts, metrology), then production (quality, customer quality, application engineers, inside sales). The figure lays out the sequence.

Shifts. "Second shift" or a rotating twelve-hour schedule means the plant expects to run around the clock, which is a plant with a product. Customer quality. A customer quality engineer with PPAP experience is the most specific tell on the whole careers page: a customer is qualifying parts right now. Reposts. The same senior process role posted for six months is hard to fill, which is common here, because the people in the West who have run a sintered magnet line would fit in a medium-sized conference room. A staffing risk, not a red flag.

Finally, look at what is NOT posted. A company that says it is in production and is hiring for none of the production roles is either fully staffed, which is possible, or not yet where it says it is.

How to read a slip chart
Keep a ledger

The first date is a guess and the second date is information. Watch whether it holds, and whether the verb moves from "will" to "has."

Find the smallest true version

Investor-facing announcements sound as big as they can. Judge the company on what the headline shrinks to by the last paragraph.

Ask who carries the IP risk

When a magnet infringes, the exposure lands on whoever imported it. An indemnity clause is the answer that costs the supplier something.

Keep a globe handy

Put every step on a map and count the oceans. Crossings at the top of the funnel cost the most per kilogram of finished magnet.

References

Everything that is a claim about a company, a quantity, a date or a patent gets a footnote. Earnings-call quotes come from third-party transcripts, as footnote 1 explains. Footnote 2 says how the slip chart flatters and how it doesn't; footnote 7 names the limit of the cost example; footnotes 25 and 27 say what the Molycorp map and the funnel arithmetic can and cannot carry.

  1. Sources for every point on the chart, in date order. Company releases and filings are primary. Earnings-call quotes are from third-party transcripts (Equibles, The Motley Fool, Investing.com), not from an official transcript, so the wording may differ slightly from the webcast.
    • 9 Dec 2021: MP Materials, "MP Materials to build U.S. magnet factory, enters long-term supply agreement with General Motors": "a gradual production ramp is expected to begin in 2023."
    • 24 Feb 2022: Q4 2021 call, transcript: "a gradual expansion into finished magnet production in the 2025 timeframe."
    • 21 Apr 2022: groundbreaking release, mpmaterials.com: "expected to begin in late 2023, starting with alloy."
    • 5 May 2022: Q1 2022 call, transcript: "start selling alloy to GM in late 2023, with magnet deliveries commencing in 2025."
    • 23 Feb 2023: Q4 2022 call, transcript: "begin delivering alloy to GM late this year, followed by magnets in 2025."
    • 2 Nov 2023: Q3 2023 results: "begun trial production of NdPr metal."
    • 22 Feb 2024: Q4 2023 call, transcript: "making metal in Fort Worth this year"; "our magnet production target by the end of 2025."
    • 7 Nov 2024: Q3 2024 call, transcript: "on track to deliver metal by year-end"; "commercial magnet production by the end of next year."
    • 22 Jan 2025: "MP Materials restores U.S. rare earth magnet production": see footnote 5.
    • 7 Aug 2025: Q2 2025 call, transcript: "on schedule to commence commercial production by year-end."
    • 6 Nov 2025: Q3 2025 call, transcript: "producing finished magnets by year-end 2025"; see footnote 4.
    • December 2025: per the Q2 2026 results, the company "commenced manufacturing neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets" in December 2025.
    • 6 Aug 2026: Q2 2026 call; see footnote 4.
  2. The chart is mine, and it is kinder in some places and harsher in others than a different chart would be. Kinder: plotting every promise at the latest date its words allow gives the company the benefit of every doubt. "In 2023" could fairly be read as mid-2023, which would make the first metal line look six months worse. Harsher, or at least debatable: I have joined "first alloy" and "first metal" into one line. They are not the same product, and a stricter reader would call the November 2023 change a change of scope as well as a slip. And the milestones are my choice. A chart of capacity (the 1,000 metric tons a year first announced, since raised) would tell a different story again, because the capacity target has grown while the schedule was being met. Treat this as one way to lay out the record, not the only one.
  3. Q3 2023 call, 2 November 2023, transcript. Both quotes are the chief executive's.
  4. Q3 2025 call, 6 November 2025, transcript: "This will kick off an accelerated qualification process with GM, with magnet revenue expected to begin in the second half of 2026." Q2 2026 call, 6 August 2026, transcript: "we delivered magnets to GM for in-vehicle qualification testing, and we continue to expect to begin commercial shipments in the fourth quarter"; the chief operating officer on "a wide range of technical, operational, and customer-driven challenges." As of this page's date, no commercial shipment had been announced.
  5. MP Materials, 22 January 2025, "MP Materials restores U.S. rare earth magnet production": the facility "has commenced commercial production of neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) metal and trial production of automotive-grade, sintered neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets," with "First Deliveries on Track for Year-End."
  6. MP Materials, third-quarter 2025 results, 6 November 2025: Magnetics segment revenue of $21.9 million, from magnetic precursor product deliveries that began in the first quarter of 2025.
  7. MP Materials, 21 April 2022, groundbreaking release. The company has not, as far as I can find, published a capital figure for Independence on its own, so this check can only be done on the combined program. That is a real limit on the example: a combined budget can hold while one of its parts runs over.
  8. Q4 2023 call, 22 February 2024, transcript. The chief financial officer.
  9. Arnold Magnetic Technologies, Markets and, for a typical product page, RECOMA samarium cobalt magnets. As checked in September 2026. Websites change; that is rather the point of re-checking once a year.
  10. VACUUMSCHMELZE, Contact.
  11. TDK, neodymium magnets.
  12. US International Trade Commission, 18 September 2012, "USITC institutes Section 337 investigation on certain sintered rare earth magnets, methods of making same, and products containing same" (Inv. No. 337-TA-855). The respondents are named in the release. I have not named them here: they were customers, and the point is what happened to customers, not which ones.
  13. Federal Register, 18 July 2013: termination of the investigation on an unopposed motion by the complainants.
  14. US 5,645,651, "Magnetic materials and permanent magnets," priority 1982, Sumitomo Special Metals: Google Patents. Expiry dates for it and for the four ITC patents (US 6,461,565; 6,491,765; 6,527,874; 6,537,385) from John Ormerod, "NdFeB magnet patents update", Bunting. Patent expiry dates depend on term adjustments and fee payments; for anything that matters, have a patent attorney confirm them.
  15. US 7,559,996, "Rare earth permanent magnet, making method, and permanent magnet rotary machine," Shin-Etsu Chemical, priority 2005, status active with anticipated expiration 18 March 2027: Google Patents. Google's status and expiry fields are estimates, not legal conclusions.
  16. Patents assigned to Noveon Magnetics Inc., including US 11,557,411, 11,942,245 and 12,347,592, "Grain boundary engineering of sintered magnetic alloys and the compositions derived therefrom": Justia Patents.
  17. Magnequench, Patent Information Guide, 2022.
  18. VACUUMSCHMELZE, VACODYM NdFeB magnets, grade table with per-grade datasheets. "About seventy-five" is my count on the day I checked; the table changes.
  19. Arnold Magnetic Technologies, for example the N42 datasheet: "Demagnetization curves show nominal Br and minimum Hci."
  20. eVAC, 12 December 2025, "eVAC's South Carolina facility ships first U.S.-made rare earth magnets". Capacity and timing are the company's own statement. Which grades Sumter itself ships today is not stated there.
  21. USA Rare Earth, 18 November 2025, "USA Rare Earth closes acquisition of Less Common Metals".
  22. Molycorp, Inc., annual report on Form 10-K for 2011: 90.023% of AS Silmet acquired 1 April 2011 and the remainder 24 October 2011; Santoku America, Inc., Tolleson, Arizona, acquired 15 April 2011; the Intermetallics Japan joint venture with Daido Steel and Mitsubishi Corporation formed 28 November 2011, at Nakatsugawa, Gifu Prefecture. Silmet processed rare earths and rare metals. It was not a mine.
  23. Molycorp, Form 10-K for 2012: Neo Material Technologies acquired 11 June 2012, with Magnequench powder plants "in Tianjin, China, and Korat, Thailand" and separation plants at Jiangyin and Zibo. The chief executive's quote is from the March 2012 announcement as reported by MINING.COM.
  24. Molycorp, recast 2011 annual report, filed August 2012: "We transport cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium and samarium oxide products from our Molycorp Mountain Pass facility to Molycorp Sillamäe and Molycorp Tolleson to produce rare earth metals and alloys"; sales to Santoku were 86% of the magnetic materials and alloys segment's sales from April to December 2011. Santoku Corporation is a Japanese company; the filing names the customer, not the port, so "Japan" here means the customer's home, not a traced shipment.
  25. Molycorp, Form 10-K for 2013: Silmet bought light rare earth carbonates from a third party that supplied about 34% of its feed in 2013 and 84% in 2012, and "the remainder … was shipped from our Molycorp Mountain Pass facility"; Jiangyin and Zibo, "starting in 2013, procured a portion of their feedstock materials from our Molycorp Mountain Pass facility"; the magnet segment's oxide "is generally converted into the corresponding metal form at Ganzhou Keli Rare Earth New Material Co., Ltd., an equity method investee." The two-thirds figure is my subtraction from those percentages. The filings do not say which ocean route any cargo took, and the arrows on the map are drawn between sites, not along shipping lanes. I also found nothing in the public record showing oxide going from Estonia back to Arizona, so the map does not draw it.
  26. MP Materials, bastnaesite concentrate product page: "total rare earth oxide (TREO) content exceeding 62%" and "greater than 15% neodymium (Nd) and praseodymium (Pr) … on a total rare earth oxide (TREO) basis." Today's concentrate, used here as the best public figure for what comes off that hill. What Molycorp shipped abroad was a purified, unseparated concentrate and carbonate whose grade it did not disclose, so its multiple would be smaller than 3.8, though still well above one.
  27. US Department of Energy, "Rare Earth Permanent Magnets: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment", February 2022: "Sintered NdFeB magnets are composed of roughly 30% RE material, 69% iron, and 1% boron by weight." The 3.8 metric tons is my arithmetic, and it undercuts itself: it treats all of the magnet's rare earth as NdPr (some is dysprosium or terbium), takes oxide to metal at about 85% by mass, and ignores every yield loss along the way. Losses would make the number bigger, and a purer concentrate would make it smaller. Treat it as "several tons," not as 3.8.
  28. Molycorp, 26 August 2015, "Molycorp to move its Mountain Pass rare earth facility to 'care and maintenance' mode": "Rare earth pricing, which has declined dramatically over the past four years, was a key factor," with customers to be served "via its production facilities in Estonia and China." The judgment that the map was one of the fatal flaws is mine, not the company's.
  29. IPO prospectus, 29 July 2010: "approximately $511 million in capital costs prior to the end of 2012"; Form 10-K for 2012: "approximately $1.45 billion for the modernization, expansion and other capital projects." The later figure covers a larger project than the first one did, because an expansion was added after the IPO, so it is not a like-for-like overrun.
  30. Fortune, 25 June 2015, "Molycorp is filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy."

When keeping score isn't enough

Everything above is public, and you can do most of it yourself. When the answer matters (an investment, an offtake, a supply agreement, a plant plan), I assess companies in detail on both sides at once: whether the technology and the plant can do what is claimed, and whether the business can be built at the cost and on the schedule claimed. Startups and established producers alike.

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